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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1216 
_____________ 
 
GLENDA CAIN, 
                          Appellant 
           
v. 
 
WELLSPAN HEALTH  
                            
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District Of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 08-cv-1704 
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2011  
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 25, 2011) 
 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
                              
      
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 
 Glenda Cain, who is African-American, was employed by York Hospital, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Wellspan Health (“Wellspan”), as a team-leader in the York 
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Hospital cafeteria.  Cain was purportedly dismissed for permitting her subordinate to 
make unauthorized entries into the Hospital’s electronic time keeping system in such a 
way that suggested Cain had arrived to work on time when in fact she had not.  Following 
her termination, Cain filed suit against Wellspan, alleging race and gender discrimination 
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law claims for breach of 
contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Wellspan on all counts.  Cain now appeals.  We will 
affirm.
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I. 
 We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and 
procedural history of this case, which are carefully set forth in the District Court’s 
opinion.  See Cain v. Wellspan Health, No. 1:08-cv-1704, 2009 WL 5112352, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2009).  In her detailed and thoughtful opinion, Judge Rambo 
explained her reasons for granting Wellspan’s motion for summary judgment on the same 
issues raised on appeal.  Since we can add little to the District Court’s reasoning, we will 
affirm the order granting summary judgment substantially for the reasons set forth in the 
court’s opinion.2   
                                                          
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
2
   We will discuss one argument in greater detail.  Appellant also maintains that the 
District Court did not consider that her federal discrimination claims arose out of 
Wellspan’s failure to “allow her to confront her accusers and have an opportunity to be 
represented by an attorney during the termination process.”  Bl. Br. 7.  We disagree with 
appellant’s characterization of the District Court opinion.  The District Court did consider 
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II. 
 Next, we consider Wellspan’s pending motion for sanctions, filed on July 28, 
2010, which seeks imposition of costs or dismissal of Cain’s appeal.  Wellspan cites two 
reasons in support of this motion:  (1) appellant’s failure to provide a credible explanation 
for filing her opening brief three days after the filing deadline of July 12, 2010 and 
Wellspan’s late receipt of Cain’s submissions; and (2) appellant’s violation of this 
Court’s July 21, 2010 Non-Compliance Order.  On July 21, 2010, this Court ordered 
appellant to remedy certain defects in the filing of her brief and appendix by July 26, 
2010.  Although appellant complied with some of our requirements by the deadline, she 
did not come into complete compliance with the Order until August 6, 2010.  It is within 
our discretion to sanction an attorney or party for failing to comply with a court order or 
the filing requirements set forth in our local rules.  L.A.R. 107.3.    
 Given that appellant satisfied all the requirements of our Non-Compliance Order 
by August 6, 2010, and in light of the fact that on August 17, 2010 we granted appellant’s 
motion to file the brief and appendix out of time, we will deny Wellspan’s motion for 
sanctions.       
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the “procedures employed by Wellspan to investigate the allegations of wrong doing by 
Cain” but found these procedures were relevant only if Cain “had produced evidence that 
Wellspan used some other procedures where similar complaints were lodged against 
Caucasian or male employees.”  Id.  at *8.  However, Cain “has produced no such 
evidence, and, thus, her focus on the underlying investigation is merely a distraction.”  Id.  
In short, Judge Rambo concluded that “[t]he record is devoid of any evidence that 
Wellspan approached other similarly situated allegations of dishonesty differently.”  Id.  
We agree.  For this same reason, we are not now persuaded by appellant’s argument that 
the procedures of the grievance process provided evidence of race or gender 
discrimination, given that appellant did not provide any evidence that other complaints 
were treated differently.    
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III. 
 For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Wellspan and deny Wellspan’s motion for sanctions. 
